A Phenomenological Reading of Anomalous Monism by A. Zhok
A phenomenological reading of anomalous monism 
 
Andrea Zhok 
 
 In Mental Events (1970) Donald Davidson proposed a theory 
concerning the relationship between mental and physical events, which he 
named “anomalous monism”; this theory has been thoroughly discussed in the 
last decades and has been re-exposed and qualified by Davidson himself in 
many writings. Nevertheless it is hard to say that anomalous monism has ever 
reached a fully settled interpretive status: several powerful criticisms 
notwithstanding, the argument as a whole remains attractive and intuitively 
persuasive to many philosophers. In the following pages I am not going to 
provide a further immanent reading of Davidson’s reasoning with the 
aspiration to discover either an unexplored strand of objections or a tighter and 
smarter account of the same reasoning. Instead, I will discuss anomalous 
monism as an exemplary attempt to deal with the relationship between the 
physical and the mental within a physicalist framework and I will try to 
interpret it in the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. The mention of 
Husserl’s phenomenology in connection with Davidson may sound like a 
strained pairing, yet, granted that the differences in philosophical style could 
hardly be greater, the Husserlian position on the mental/physical relationship 
has been itself authoritatively understood as a kind of  “anomalous monism” 
(cf. Smith D.W., 1995: 362f) and this for good reasons. I believe that reading 
the Davidsonian argument for anomalous monism through the lens of 
Husserlian phenomenology can be fruitful for both approaches with reference 
to the conceptualization of the mental and the physical, and with particular 
reference to the controversial issue of mental causation. 
 
1 The argument for anomalous monism 
 
 The core structure of the argument for anomalous monism consists of 
three theses that seem at first sight incompatible. The first thesis is called by 
Davidson the principle of Causal Interaction (CI) and says that “mental events 
interact causally with physical events” (Davidson 1970, p. 208). This seems 
prima facie uncontroversial: perception shows how mental events can be 
caused by physical events, and human actions are instances of mental events 
causing physical events. The second thesis is called the principle of the 
Nomological Character of Causality (NC) and states that “events related as 
cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws” (ibid.). The basic idea is 
that each singular causal statement is to be subsumed under a covering law -- a 
strict law -- which is predictive, like the laws deployed by physical science. 
The third thesis is the principle of the Anomalism of the Mental (AM), which 
states that “there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental 
events can be predicted and explained” (ibid.). At first glance the three theses 
seem to be mutually incompatible, since it seems that from CI and NC one 
must draw the conclusion that mental events should fall under strict laws, 
which contradicts AM. However Davidson rejects such incompatibility by 
arguing as follows: 
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Causality and identity are relations between individual events 
no matter how described. But laws are linguistic; and so events 
can instantiate laws, and hence be explained or predicted in the 
light of laws, only as those events are described in one or 
another way. The principle of causal interaction deals with 
events in extension and is therefore blind to the mental-physical 
dichotomy. The principle of the anomalism of the mental 
concerns events described as mental, for events are mental only 
as described. (1970, p. 215) 
 
 In other words, NC implies only that events de facto related as cause 
and effect have descriptions that instantiate a law; it does not imply that 
whenever events respectively describable as mental and physical causally 
interact, this interaction instantiates a law. Laws depend on how events are 
actually described and, according to Davidson, when we describe events as 
mental we provide a characterization that does not allow these events to be 
subsumed under strict laws. 
 Of course the Anomalism of the Mental could be straightforwardly 
argued for in a dualistic framework, but one of the striking features of 
Davidson’s reasoning is that AM together with CI and NC is actually used to 
support monism, by which Davidson means a theory of the identity of mental 
and physical events. The argument runs as follows: if psychological events 
causally interact with physical events [CI], the second principle [NC] implies 
that there are strict laws that cover them. But by the third principle [AM], 
those laws cannot be psychophysical, “so they must be purely physical laws.” 
(1974, p. 231) The conclusion is monistic because it holds that psychological 
events are physical events, even if mental events, when described as such, do 
not fall under strict laws. Thus, Davidson states the anomalism of the mental 
as an a priori thesis in a physicalistic framework, which is notoriously a 
framework that is most often regarded as conducive to reductionist positions. 
 Many objections have been raised against anomalous monism, among 
which the most persistent and comprehensive one is the charge of entailing the 
epiphenomenalism of mental properties. It has been argued that under the 
premises of anomalous monism no causal powers are left to mental events, 
since causality is to be attributed to the extensional dimension belonging to 
physical events. So, for instance, Jaegwon Kim (2000, p. 37) has noticed that, 
if we assume that an event p is caused by a mental event m, then, since we 
must admit that p has also a physical cause (which must be granted, if the 
physical domain is to be considered a closed system), then it is obscure “what 
causal work is left for m to contribute” (see also Honderich 1988, p. 94). It 
seems that mental events should not play any substantial causal role, but this 
conclusion, if accepted, would contradict the principle of Causal Interaction 
invoked by Davidson as first premise of his argument. In order to clarify 
Davidson’s argument we have to clarify five notions that represent the main 
conceptual props supporting anomalous monism: the attributes of “mental” (1) 
and “physical” (2), and the ideas of “law” (3), “event” (4) and “cause” (5). 
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 (1) The dimension of the mental to which Davidson refers while 
discussing anomalous monism is the sphere of propositional attitudes (1970, 
p. 210); “mental” is an attribute of descriptions and it is legitimately attributed 
to expressions containing “at least one mental verb essentially” (1970, p. 211). 
It must be noticed that the mentioned specification “essentially” is necessary 
but problematic. Granted that the occurrence of a mental verb cannot be 
accidental, to claim its essential occurrence does it mean that a mental verb 
can legitimately occur in the relevant description or that it must occur? Neither 
solution seems promising: on the one hand a mental verb can legitimately 
occur in all descriptions, since any propositional content can be truly described 
by using a mental verb (I believe that water boils at 100 C°). In this sense there 
would be no description that is not mental. On the other hand, if what is meant 
is that some mental verbs must occur, it is hard to see how any description 
would, on its own, require to be put in mental terms. Indeed, in the framework 
of Davidson’s thought the only plausible position is that we have reasons to 
interpret some descriptions in certain contexts in mental terms. These reasons 
depend on the normative nature of the interpretation of meaningful utterances: 
in order to make sense of others’ expressions we have to interpret them in a 
way that optimizes agreement (Principle of Charity). And when we do so, we 
produce interpretive hypotheses that necessarily have a holistic character, 
since “[b]eliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and mediated 
by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit.” (1970, 
p. 217) Granted that such normative and holistic features characterize mental 
descriptions, this is no objective criterion for determining when a description 
“essentially” requires to be put in mental terms: we can only assume that we 
have interest or motivation to provide some descriptions in mental terms with 
regard to certain contents and contexts. Once we have provided such 
descriptions, if we have chosen to do so, they have a normative and holistic 
character that represents the main basis of their irreconcilability with physical 
descriptions, and therefore of their anomalism. 
 (2) As to the determination of the physical, Davidson’s characterization 
is not very helpful, since he merely maintains that “[p]hysical events are those 
picked out by descriptions or open sentences that contain only the physical 
vocabulary essentially.” (1970, p. 211) The idea is that physical descriptions 
are the ones provided strictly in the language of physical science. However, 
this is hardly a clear-cut criterion for the physical. What properly belongs to 
physical vocabulary? Just physical laws expressed in symbols? It cannot be so, 
since we must be able to connect those abstract symbols to experiences and 
phenomena with specifically physical content. But as soon as we have passed 
the minimal threshold ideally provided by strings of uninterpreted formal 
symbols, we come to the terrain of the ordinary use of language, where we 
could regard as part of physical language all meanings that help us to fill with 
meaning physical symbols. But this consideration could indefinitely extend the 
area of “physical language”. Apparently we cannot determine the sphere of the 
physical just by extrinsically appealing to the use of physical vocabulary. But 
then, how could we otherwise determine the nature of the physical? Davidson 
tries to provide an answer by appealing to the nature of “strict laws”: physical 
events are events that can be explained by strict laws, which are in fact ideal 
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physical laws. Strict laws are laws that forego causal concepts and ceteris 
paribus clauses. We will deal next with the relationship between law and 
cause, but for the identification of the physical the reference to the absence of 
ceteris paribus clauses in physical laws is of special interest. Ceteris paribus 
clauses are clauses that rule out factors potentially interfering in a causal 
connection, therefore laws that can do without ceteris paribus clauses are laws 
“treating the universe as a closed system” (Davidson 1993, p. 191). Under 
these conditions, we would have a truly universal law, where the relevant 
physical events are fully explained without going out of the physical domain. 
Unfortunately, no actual physical law can warrant that there is no longer need 
of ceteris paribus clauses (cf. Cartwright 1980): all observations and 
experiments we can perform rely on local regularities that allow us to 
concentrate on specific changes and their possible connections, but in order to 
knowingly exclude all possible interferences on the law-like connection that 
we want to establish, we should be able to look at the observed system from 
the point of view of God. 
 Davidson defines the principle of the closure of the physical realm in 
the following terms: “It is a feature of physical reality that physical change can 
be explained by laws that connect it with other changes and conditions 
physically described.” (1970, p. 222) But if this is “a feature of physical 
reality,” it is definitely no feature that we can inductively draw from the 
observation of events. On the contrary, it seems clear that this is rather a 
normative ideal, and precisely an ideal that helps Davidson to determine what 
must count as physical in the first place. No empirically tested law can warrant 
that all factors possibly affecting the tested systems have been taken into 
account, but the principle of the causal closure of the physical requires that 
everything claiming to be a physical law aspires to that ideal 
comprehensiveness: any physical change is prompted by other physical 
changes, even if we do not know which ones. Indeed, over the years Davidson 
has repeatedly admitted that he was not dealing with actual physics but with 
“something that one could at best hope to find in a developed physics” (1993, 
p. 191). This seems to lead us to the conclusion that also the notion of the 
physical, and not just the notion of the mental, is constitutively normative. 
 (3) Let us briefly turn to the notion of law. Laws are said to be 
universally quantified statements that support counterfactuals (Davidson 1995, 
p. 203). In this acceptation, whenever we produce an explanation endowed 
with predictive powers we display an instantiation of a law. In Davidson’s 
proposal, laws are epistemic devices and not ontological assumptions; they are 
ways in which we provide explanatory accounts of events. Nevertheless he 
appears to be realist about laws of nature, since he claims that even if we do 
not know precisely which laws there are, we know that laws there are. This is 
not meant as an ontological postulate, but is a thesis drawn from our basic 
understanding of causal relations and counterfactual truths: whenever we 
interpret a succession of events in causal terms we implicitly appeal to the 
existence of underlying laws, even if we are unable “to dredge up a law” 
(Davidson 1967, p. 160) 
 Yet, not everything is clear in this reasoning. What does it mean that an 
appropriate causal law exists? To begin with, it seems that the very appeal to 
Eliminato: exclude 
Eliminato:  But, as we will see, this is a conclusion that Davidson 
resists.
Formattato: Tipo di carattere: 11 pt
Formattato: Giustificato, Rientro: Sinistro:  0 cm, Destro 0
cm, Interlinea: singola
Eliminato: N
Formattato: Tipo di carattere: Corsivo
Eliminato: .¶
¶
[I]t does not follow that we must be able to dredge up a law if we 
know a singular causal statement to be true; all that follows is that we 
know there must be a covering law. And very often, I think, our 
justification for accepting a singular causal statement is that we have 
reason to believe an appropriate causal law exists, though we do not 
know what it is. 
Formattato: Tipo di carattere: 12 pt
Eliminato: ¶
Formattato: Giustificato, Interlinea: singola
 5 
“laws” is overdrawn, as mere regularities are enough to justify the recognition 
of singular causal statements. This is the case both if we consider laws to be 
something ontologically subsistent (laws inherent in nature), and if we regard 
laws just as anthropic explanatory devices. The idea of law of nature, which is 
originally of theological descent (cf. Giere 1999, p. 86f.), does not merely 
assume that nature behaves so and so but implies that nature must behave so 
and so because of its subjection to the law. Granted that we have excellent 
reasons to wish that laws there are -- since otherwise all our acts and forecasts 
would be boundlessly exposed to sheer accidentality -- we must nevertheless 
justify our belief in such existence, beyond the recognition of regularities. 
Regularities (the uniformity of nature of which Hume speaks) are phenomenal 
data -- that is, they concern the relationship between subject and object -- 
whereas the realist about laws of nature must conceive of subject-independent 
rules governing the behaviour of objects. As van Fraassen (1989, pp. 72f, 96f) 
has noticed, if we want to assert the mind-independent status of laws of nature, 
we must (at least) identify a third factor beyond the regular conjunction of two 
classes of events and then see if such factor is up to the task of necessarily 
connecting those events. Otherwise, we have just to do with regularities and 
with our wish to grasp them by means of law-like statements. 
 If a belief in the independent existence of laws of nature proper is not 
easy to argue for, the existence of laws as epistemic devices is no easier to 
justify. How can we state, as Davidson does, that, given singular causal 
statements, law-like epistemic devices exist? We can at most say that, given 
some regularities, we will try to come up with an appropriate covering law. 
But why should we be certain that such a law will be found? 
 In Laws and Cause (1995) Davidson tries to clarify the sense in which 
singular causal statements entail laws. In the context of a criticism of 
Ducasse’s notion of cause, he states that in order to establish that something is 
a cause or an effect we must establish its identity as event (change). He then 
states that we can do so only against a background held to be constant: “It is 
not surprising […] that singular causal statements imply the existence of 
covering laws: events are changes that explain and require such explanations” 
(1995, p. 212). The picture that he is proposing seems to be the following: 
when we identify something as an event (change), we do it on the basis of 
what we want to explain, and consequently we choose what must count as 
unchanged background. Under these premises we can grant that whenever we 
meet a singular causal statement we are committed to the existence of 
appropriate covering laws. It seems clear, however, that this approach grants 
vast authority to our subjective (or intersubjective) interests and under these 
premises, a naturalistic (objectivistic) reading of laws of nature becomes very 
awkward. 
 Yet, Davidson maintains the naturalistic framework by another route. 
He interprets in biological terms the role of subjective interests in our 
commitment to the existence of laws; in this connection, he recalls that “we 
are inducers from birth” and that “we build the law-like habits that promote 
survival and enhance life” (1995, p. 215). This is an interesting argument, but 
it seems to reduce the covering laws of physics to products of an epistemic 
process driven by basic biological interests. Even if we allow this strategy, it is 
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hard to see how this could be conducive to a realistic understanding of laws of 
nature. Even if laws are still part of a naturalistic framework, they would be 
such only as conceptual devices produced (in the last instance) on biological 
grounds, and there would not be much room left for a realistic reading of their 
content. Especially, it does not seem that this proposal is up to the task of 
justifying the appeal to strict laws implicit in NC. With regard to loose laws as 
much as strict ones, the fact that we are allegedly committed to the existence 
of such laws does not warrant either that we can find them or that they exist in 
themselves (in some sense). 
 (4) While laws belong to the explanatory sphere, the notion of cause is 
taken to refer to the extensional substrate that calls for a law as its explanation. 
Unfortunately, what is meant by “cause” is far from clear in the Davidsonian 
approach, and this lack of clarity rests on the ambiguity of the apparently 
obvious extensional character of causality. When Davidson explains CI, he 
exemplifies causality by referring to how sensations are caused by the world 
or to how beliefs and desires cause actions. At the same time he complains that 
many misunderstandings concerning NC depend on confusion between the 
extensional nature of causes, which is indifferent to how causes are described, 
and the nature of explanations, which describe causal relations in the terms 
more appropriate to explanatory interests. So, he says, “there is no room for a 
concept of ‘cause as’” (1993, p. 188): events in themselves are the protagonists 
of causation, not events as mental or events as physical. 
 However, such neat distinction between the extensional sphere of 
causation and its explanatory dimension is not quite transparent. If we really 
had to take actual event causality as something that must be exempt from all 
descriptions, we would be uneasy with any straightforward interpretation of 
CI: while at first sight it seemed perfectly clear what was meant by causal 
interaction between mental events and physical events, now our representation 
of that principle seems blurred. In fact, its proper content should actually 
sound something like: “we are prone to explain extensional causal interactions 
by describing causes and effects respectively in mental and physical terms (or 
vice versa)”. This version of CI is consistent with the previous considerations 
on the crucial role of subjective (or intersubjective) interests, but it leaves our 
understanding of events and causes rather uncertain. Under the present 
premises, Davidson’s account of causation should be very austere, leaving 
aside everything univocally attributable to how extensional relations between 
events are described. Such an interpretive feat is not theoretically trivial (see 
section 3 below), yet Davidson does not seem to worry much about it. For 
him, the instances of causation exemplified with reference to sensations and 
actions are instances of event causality, which is efficient causality between 
events. Sensations cause our beliefs, although they do not justify them (1983, 
p. 143); this is the only sense in which experience can be said to be the source 
of our knowledge (1982, pp. 174-5). 
Still, one may wonder whether Davidson, by resorting in Quinean style 
to an ordinary notion of naturalistically understood causation, is being radical 
enough: it is hard to grant that a thesis, according to which sensations drawn 
from the external world are efficient causes affecting the constitution of our 
beliefs, is untainted by epistemic considerations. If it is true, as Davidson 
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states, that we cannot “get outside our skins” to compare the worldly causes of 
our beliefs with the contents of our beliefs (1983, p. 144), one may wonder 
how we could get outside our skins to establish the nature of the dependence 
of our beliefs on the world and see that it is an instantiation of efficient 
causality. 
 If we look now at the connection between reasons (beliefs and desires) 
and actions as it is argued in “Agency” (1971), we can raise the same kind of 
doubt. Although Davidson introduces at a certain point the notion of agent 
causality (1971, p. 52), in the last instance reasons are said to be causes of 
actions in the ordinary sense of event causality. Davidson introduces the 
notion of agent causation because the ordinary notion of event causality is 
useful to explain “how agency can spread from primitive actions […] but it 
cannot in the same way explain the basic sense of agency” (1971, p. 52). After 
introducing agent causation he specifies that “[w]hat distinguishes agent 
causation from ordinary causation is that no expansion into a tale of two 
events is possible, and no law lurks” (1971, p. 53). 
 The point that agent causation does not involve “a tale of two events” 
means, that when we describe actions we do not provide accounts of causal 
transmission as propagation between contiguous events: we extend the action 
unit to cover its “completion” (wherever we think that the pertinent 
completion lies). This descriptive peculiarity is termed “accordion effect”, 
since the same action appears to be describable in shorter or longer units, 
according to the intended extension of the chain of consequences. The same 
action can be legitimately described by saying that I struck a ball with a bat or 
that (by doing so) I broke the window, but we would not accept the description 
“the bat broke the window”: event causality propagates only contiguously. 
 Since agent causation is concerned with the effects (completion) of the 
act and since the choice of the relevant effects depends on our description of 
the event in intentional terms, Davidson can also make the point that “no law 
lurks”: we are not in a position to produce predictive laws with reference to 
actions. Still, here we find an apparent contradiction between Davidson’s 
claims, since he contends (NC) that “events related as cause and effect fall 
under strict deterministic laws”, while he states, with reference to actions, that 
“we must appeal to the notion of cause when we lack detailed and accurate 
laws” (1980, p. 80), adding that, in this sense, “most, if not all, mental 
concepts are irreducibly causal” (2005, p. 216). How is it possible that causal 
interactions constitutively fall under strict laws, while actions described in 
causal terms express the lack of accurate laws? In fact, there is no 
contradiction since, as we said, we can ignore the underlying laws and still 
maintain that underlying laws there are. But this prompts us to pay attention to 
the real meaning of NC, which implies that when we interpret actions in causal 
terms we are after laws that are presently lacking. Indeed, NC should be 
expressed in normative and dynamic terms, and not in static and descriptive 
ones. The true meaning of “events related as cause and effect fall under strict 
deterministic laws” should rather sound like “in the presence of some 
connections of events we are committed to describe them in causal terms, 
paving the way for our search for the most appropriate laws”.  
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Of course, under this interpretation, Davidson’s statement that causes 
and effects “fall under strict deterministic laws” is quite misleading, because 
they do not fall anywhere on their own. In this normative sense, the causal 
reading of a relation between events is just a preliminary step toward a 
possible (but not certain) upgrade of our knowledge through the discovery of 
laws, occasionally strict ones. When we deal with mental determinations, our 
commitment to the peculiarities of reasons and intentions overcomes our 
commitment to find strict laws; therefore we must stay at the level of causal 
relations without being able to reach the level of true explanatory laws. This 
reading is confirmed by the last pages of “Three Varieties of Knowledge” 
(1991), where Davidson writes that: 
 
The normative and the causal properties of mental concepts are 
related. If we were to drop the normative aspect from 
psychological explanations, they would no longer serve the 
purposes they do. We have such a keen interest in the subject’s 
reasons for acting and for his or her changes of belief that we 
are willing to settle for explanations that cannot be made to fit 
perfectly with the laws of physics. Physics, on the other hand, 
has as an aim laws that are as complete and precise as we can 
make them; a different aim (1991, p. 217).  
 
 In the end, the essential ground for the anomalism of the mental and 
the “heteronomic” character of the link between the mental and the physical 
seems to be traced back to the specific aims, or interests, that animate the 
production of interpretations in mental and physical terms respectively. Still, 
the privilege conferred to event causality in the explanation of action remains 
unjustified: it is clear that such privilege depends on event causality being 
interpreted as a neutral ground level, indifferent to descriptions in mental or 
physical terms. But this depends in turn on the alleged ‘neutrality’ of the 
notion of event, which is to be demonstrated. 
 (5) Davidson’s notion of event has changed over time, from an early 
interpretation where events were identified by their causal relations (1969, p. 
179), to a later interpretation, explicitly inspired by Quine, where events are 
identified by their spatiotemporal coordinates (1985, p. 175). It must be 
noticed that initially Davidson had considered the latter solution and rejected 
it, because “if a metal ball becomes warmer during a certain minute, and 
during the same minute rotates through 35 degrees, must we say these are the 
same event?” (1969, p. 178). Apparently, two distinct changes (events) -- like 
warming and rotating -- can take place in the same place and time. Two main 
considerations tipped the balance in favour of the individuation of events in 
spatiotemporal terms. The first was that the initial proposal, by individuating 
events in terms of identity of causes and effects, had the apparent defect that 
causes and effects, being events themselves, made the definition circular. The 
second consideration was that in an ideal physical science instantiations of 
properties, like becoming warmer, could be fully reduced to sets of 
spatiotemporal events (the motion of particles within the heating sphere). In 
this sense, for a sufficiently fine-grained physical description, each moving 
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part of the mentioned metal sphere could be treated as a spatiotemporally 
individuated event. It seems, thus, that Davidson ends up by being committed 
to an understanding of events consistent with physicalistic accounts, such that 
events are (or are reducible to) point-instants. 
 Davidson never explicitly states that events should be understood as 
point-instants, and actually, when he mentions events as experiential items it is 
clear that he does not have in mind the physicalistic idealization of point-
instants. However this difficulty can be set aside if we realize that for him 
“events have parts that are events” (1980, p. 83), and that, therefore, we can 
talk about events at different levels of elementariness. Only basic events must 
be understood as bare spatial-temporal coordinates (point-instants): they are 
unrepeatable particulars underlying various possible descriptions, but 
subsisting beyond all descriptions. Therefore, although one is not always 
required to talk of Davidson’s events as point-instants, this acceptation is the 
most appropriate when dealing with the extensional nature of events 
underlying mental and physical descriptions. 
 This fluidity in the conceptualization of events reflects an original 
problem in the treatment of events. Events are primarily introduced as the 
common phenomenal basis that allows subjects to provide a plurality of 
descriptions: events are experiential particulars that can bear various 
descriptions. Yet, events understood as ideal physical determinations in space 
and time are not the same as events understood as experiential particulars. 
Actually, if events must really be bare particulars uncompromised with 
descriptions, then saying that their nature is spatiotemporal in the sense of 
physics seems to claim too much, since one can hardly maintain that 
determinations in spatiotemporal terms are not descriptions. This point must 
be emphasised in light of the fact that most of the charges of mental 
epiphenomenalism depend on the privileged position attributed to physical 
events. Davidson seems to say that events are what they are before and 
regardless of descriptions in mental or physical terms, but his argument in 
favour of monism demands that all events are physical, while not all events are 
mental (1970, p. 214). 
 In our previous interpretation, both CI and NC had to be read in the last 
instance in a normative frame: the Principle of Causal Interaction becomes 
something like “we are prone to explain some token causal interactions by 
describing causes and effects respectively in mental and physical terms,” and 
the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality translates into: “in the 
presence of some connections of events, we are committed to describing them 
in causal terms, in order to pave the way for our search for the most 
appropriate laws”. Hence, the connection of CI and NC, so interpreted, implies 
that when we try to explain a connection of events in causal terms (which we 
are naturally prone to do), we are bound to look for strict laws, and this is true 
even when we are interested in a link between events respectively described in 
mental and physical terms. However, in this latter case our propensity to find 
strict laws is bound to be frustrated because of AM, which amounts to the fact 
that the concepts we use when we want to provide an account in mental terms 
are not compatible with the ones occurring in physical laws. Put in these 
terms, the argument sounds less intriguing than in the original version, but 
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certainly much smoother. But what about monism? Can monism still be 
demonstrated in this new version?  
 It seems that it cannot be properly demonstrated, but that it must be 
assumed. In fact, in “Mental Events” Davidson argues in favour of monism on 
the basis of the fact that, whenever a mental event causes a physical event, 
under some description they instantiate a strict law, which can only be 
physical. And insofar as a mental event falls under a physical law, it is a 
physical event. “So every mental event that is causally related to a physical 
event is a physical event.” (1970, p. 224) But in the normative interpretation 
the fact that a mental event is interpreted as causing a physical event does not 
imply that under some description this relation instantiates a strict law; it 
merely implies that we are committed to find such a law. Indeed, if we found 
one, we know that it would be a physical law (by definition), but there is no 
guarantee that there should ever be one. Consequently, the reasoning does not 
conclude that every mental event which is causally related to a physical event 
is a physical event in turn; rather, it amounts to saying that we are committed 
to read events in physical terms: we are “naturally” committed to physical 
monism. This is neither an uninteresting conclusion nor an uncontroversial 
one, but it is in any case a rather different thesis from the original one. If we 
try to make coherent the claims of CI and NC, the result, far from supporting 
the epiphenomenalism of the mental, could even be read as a form of idealism 
(cf. Evnine 1991, pp. 155ff), since the role played by subjective interests and 
intersubjective agreement in descriptions seems to be overwhelming. 
However, it is also clear that Davidson himself is committed to a naturalistic 
framework, where events and causes are physical regardless of how they are 
described. It seems that in Davidson’s approach there is a tension between a 
possible idealistic (or at least subjectivistic) reading and an explicit naturalistic 
commitment, while there are no conceptual resources capable of coping with 
that tension. 
 
2 Husserl on Events and Causes 
 
 Edmund Husserl is another author whose work is permeated by a 
special tension between a possible idealistic reading and a peculiar attention to 
the commitment to naturalism. But Husserl is not himself committed to 
naturalism; on the contrary, naturalism is arguably his main critical object. 
 In his last published work, Die Krisis der Europäischen 
Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1936), Husserl 
shows how the project of naturalization emerges in Western thought as a 
correlate of the effort to mathematize Being. Physical nature is no physical 
fact, but a historical construct, which is not arbitrary but cannot be taken as an 
original source of evidence. In the Krisis Husserl argues that the life-world 
(Lebenswelt) is the dimension where we find the first sources of evidence on 
which all knowledge and science must rely. The life-world is organized in 
space and time, and it has a “causal style” before and regardless of any 
scientific conceptualization, while the naturalization of such pre-scientific 
notions corresponds to a peculiar mathematical idealization of phenomena 
(Hua VI, pp. 142-3, 221). Such a process of idealization grants full legitimacy 
Eliminato:  Let us recall Davidson”s reasoning
Eliminato: :¶
¶
The demonstration of identity follows easily. Suppose m, a mental 
event, caused p, a physical event; then, under some description m and 
p instantiate a strict law. This law can only be physical, according to 
the previous paragraph. But if m falls under a physical law, it has a 
physical description; which is to say it is a physical event. An 
analogous argument works when a physical event causes a mental 
event. 
Eliminato: ¶
¶
Eliminato: We are prone to conclude
Eliminato: ”
Eliminato: conceptuality
 11 
to phenomena only insofar as they appear as subjectless objects, and therefore 
this theoretical move tends to supersede or miscognize all phenomena that do 
not fit in such an objectivistic frame.  It is from this perspective that Husserl 
warns that biophysical reality can never be legitimately reduced to physical 
reality (Hua VI, p. 391), and that interpreting motivations as instances of 
physical causality is sheer nonsense (Hua VI, p. 480). These claims of 
irreducibility are not based on any dualist view of being, since dualism is 
explicitly rejected (Hua VI, p. 62). These late positions in Husserl’s thought 
may suggest a kind of compatibility with anomalous monism, but we need to 
take a closer look at Husserlian phenomenology if we want to substantiate 
such claims. 
 In the previous pages we have raised doubts about Davidson’s 
interpretation of events, which are the “atoms” of his ontology. We have now 
to notice that, from a Husserlian perspective, interpreting the most elementary 
constituents of ontology as spatiotemporal determinations in the physical sense 
is not one mistake among others but is more like the original sin of modern 
thought. To clarify this point we have, first, to recall that Husserl’s 
phenomenological method aims to prevent hasty or dogmatic decisions 
concerning the ontological status of phenomena. Although epoché is a method 
rich in implications and aspects, its core is very simple: when we turn to any 
intentional content (i.e., to anything we can be conscious of), we must be wary 
not to decide in advance what its ontological status is; that is, we must 
suspend our judgment with reference to “reality” in a broad sense (Husserl 
speaks rather of Geltung, “validity”). We do not have to decide in advance 
what is essential and what contingent, what is actual and what delusional, what 
is objective and what subjective, and we do not have to grant any special 
privilege to specific categories or to a particular technical language. 
The peculiarity of epoché in contrast to all past philosophical methods 
is that it does not aim to narrow down ab initio the range of legitimate starting 
points by claiming the privilege of a specific class of phenomena (e.g., 
percepts, clear and distinct ideas, etc.) or of a specific way to categorize them 
(e.g., neopositivist protocols). On the contrary, epoché is characterized by the 
effort not to outlaw any intentional content in advance. What we regard as 
delusions or mistakes can be part of our phenomenal basis no less than what 
we assume to be evident or apodictic: while describing them, we can mention 
in our description also our opinion about their ontological status (e.g., unreal, 
subjective, etc.), and this opinion will be substantiated or not by how the 
described phenomenon is correlated with other phenomena. What something is 
is determined by how it appears; being is a qualified subset of appearance. 
Incidentally, this perspective suggests that dealing with ontological issues as if 
they could be treated quite independently of epistemic issues is just a 
groundless philosophical attitude. 
 Yet, equating phenomena with appearance may mislead, since 
appearance is traditionally interpreted as subjective semblance. Thus, to say 
that being is a subset of appearance may sound like a vindication of absolute 
idealism, and Husserl’s thought has often been accused of being an idealism 
akin to Berkeley’s or Fichte’s visions. However “appearance” (as well as 
“phenomenon”) is just a name for experience in the most comprehensive 
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sense. Phenomenology can be understood as a radical form of empiricism, 
insofar as ἐμπειρία is any experience, and not just the specific way in which 
we experience through our sense-organs. In an important sense, everything 
that we experience is. Epoché brings to light the primal level of being, which 
is not reality yet but the field of all possible contents of experience. In order to 
determine what can be counted as reality, we have to look at the “way of 
givenness” (Gegebenheitsart), that is, at how phenomena are given to 
consciousness. Perception turns out to be the most original way in which 
contents are given to consciousness, since all other classes of phenomena -- 
like recollections, expectations or fantasies -- intrinsically refer to the 
perceptual dimension, whereas perception can work without referring either to 
recollections, or expectations, or fantasies. Everything that is perceived is real 
in a sense (for which Husserl uses the term reell), but only percepts that 
preserve identity across a plurality of “adumbrations” (Abschattungen) are also 
real in the customary sense of existing in space, for which Husserl uses the 
term “real” (Hua III, § 41). 
 The fact that perception is the most original way of givenness, does not 
imply that perceptual objects are primal experiential elements. Perceptual 
objects are themselves constituted in a train of sensuous bodily acts unfolding 
“over time”. To see a table involves direct access to a limited number of 
sensations: the visual ones that we gather in the focussed field seen from our 
perspective. Nevertheless, we perceive the table as a whole and as available 
from an indefinite plurality of points of view. The actual sensuous 
manifestation “adumbrates” the object as a whole, whose latent aspects are 
apperceived (apperzipiert). In this sense all perceptual objects are temporally 
constituted items, which presuppose a more originary dimension of 
experience. This originary dimension manifests itself as living present 
(lebendige Gegenwart), which is a unitary intentional pattern articulated into 
primal impression (Ur-impression), the retention (Retention) of just passed 
impressions and the anticipation of immediate impressional developments 
(Protention) (Hua Mat VIII, pp. 8ff). By primal impression Husserl means 
each present sensuous givenness that affects consciousness while being 
retained as constitutive of more and more complex experiences. Primal 
impression is how sensuous present is represented in the context of the 
temporal constitution of percepts, while our actually experienced present is 
never an isolated primal impression, but a living present.  
 Although no item in the Husserlian conceptuality quite corresponds to 
the Davidsonian notion of event, I believe that the notion of primal impression 
performs an analogous function of being the elementary constituent of 
ontology. Primal impression is the minimal anonymous “something” that must 
take place in order for all further qualifications of content to develop. If 
events, reduced to their core, are anonymous “changes” available for all kinds 
of further specification, primal impressions are events. Of course, primal 
impressions are also conceptually very different from Davidsonian events, but 
to reflect on these differences is instructive. To begin with, primal impressions 
cannot be said to be either subjective or objective, either passive or active, 
either real or unreal.  When an anonymous particular change takes place for 
consciousness, consciousness is affected and reacts, and according to how the 
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chain of affections and reactions gets associated, intentional objects endowed 
with specific characteristics come to light. Neither primal impressions nor the 
way in which perceptual associations take shape are in the active power of the 
subject; however, they do not properly exist in the absence of subjectivity. We 
could say, with some approximation, that what originarily is takes place 
“between” subject and object. This way of expression is not fully correct, 
since it makes it seem that subject and object exist in themselves, with all their 
attributes, in advance of their “encounter”, whereas really the most we can say 
is that “something” must have been there in advance. As to its possible 
articulations and attributes, nothing can be stated apart from that “encounter”.  
This original encounter finds its essential manifestation in what Husserl 
calls intentionality. All contents that we are going to attribute to subject and 
object, mind and matter, etc. are produced by peculiar sedimentations of 
experiences and therefore living experience is the primum from which 
subjective and objective predicates, mental and physical qualifications, 
progressively branch off. It must be noticed that, under these premises, 
monism of a kind is simply compulsory. Here monism is the only option 
because all determinations concerning substances and attributes are generated 
from a common source, living experience, which is a dimension posited 
beyond or before any distinction between an epistemic and an ontological 
sphere.  Experiences (Erlebnisse) are not “in” the subject, because 
“consciousness is not a bag” (cf. Brough 2008), and the determinations of 
“spatial location” are constituted by intentional acts. This is no idealistic 
monism, since subjectivity (mind, consciousness) does not create being. 
Consciousness is not pure activity; it is equally reactivity and passivity 
(HuaMat VIII, p. 42). Still, consciousness can be never bypassed whenever 
Being is specified, regardless of how minimal the specification is; therefore 
materialistic monism is also ruled out: matter is already a specification to be 
motivated. 
 Husserl names “transcendence” (Transzendenz) the phenomenal 
dimension which is given to consciousness as “external” to consciousness, as 
being beyond (trans-) consciousness (Hua II, p. 72; HuaMat VIII, p. 52). What 
is transcendent is characterised by being experienced as an unexhausted source 
of information and therefore as something that we do not dominate. Husserl 
distinguishes different levels of transcendence. The most originary one is 
manifested by the way in which phenomena are originally given to subjectivity 
regardless of intersubjective relations: transcendence as it appears in the so-
called primordial sphere (Hua I, p. 141). Although at the primordial level, 
without reference to intersubjective judgment, the subject is not in a position 
to grant objective existence to anything, this does not mean that everything 
appears as “dependent on me”. Already at the original level of sensuous 
experience the subject experiences affections as something signalling 
irreducible alterity. As should be clear, the notion of transcendence captures 
the idea of being “external” to subjectivity without calling upon spatial 
determinations. On the one hand, when sensuous affections are primarily 
experienced they are not yet experienced as located in space, although such 
location is going to emerge when perceptual objects are constituted. On the 
other hand, objective entities that do not belong to the sensuous sphere (e.g., 
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essences) also manifest the character of transcendence (Hua II, pp. 9, 55ff.). 
What is transcendent is given as “external” to consciousness, but it is not 
“foreign” to consciousness; indeed, we have no right to express ourselves 
about something altogether foreign to consciousness, but we have sound 
experiential reasons to recognise items “external” to consciousness. 
 If transcendence is the dimension of what is “external” to 
consciousness, hylé is the term that Husserl uses to name matter as intentional 
correlate. The notion of hylé undergoes some changes over time, since the 
term is initially used as an equivalent of sensation a parte objecti, whereas it 
progressively assumes the further role of constituted substrate of all 
sensations. Thus the late Husserl speaks of an Empfindungshylé, which 
represents the basis for the apprehension of a naturale Hylé, which involves 
the sphere of perceptual objects in ordinary sense (HuaMat VIII, pp. 110-111). 
It is essential to observe that there is no room in this account for the ordinary 
notion of physical matter. Physical matter is ordinarily assumed to be a 
universal “substance,” existing in space and time and devoid of any particular 
quality, while being the common substrate of all special qualitative 
determinations regardless of subjective contributions. But such an account is 
groundless, since no experience can ever support it. On the contrary, the nature 
of hylé, before any intentional specification, must be determined as the 
intentional correlate of sensuous experiences. Further spatial, temporal, and 
qualitative determinations require the contribution of (embodied) 
consciousness. 
 The Husserlian notion of Realität is of more relevance for confronting 
the extensionality of Davidson’s spatiotemporal events. Husserl distinguishes 
in the semantic field of “reality” what is given as real from what is given as 
reell: all experiences exist as reell insofar as they are events in a temporally 
ordered stream, but only what we consider material nature exists as real, that 
is, it has both spatial and temporal identity; as Husserl writes at the beginning 
of Ideen II: “die Natur sei das Feld von transzendenten Realitäten, und zwar 
von räumlich-zeitlichen„ (Hua IV, p. 1). This is precisely the representation of 
nature that is of concern with regard to naturalism. Realität is extensional 
matter as it is primarily given by the experience of transcendent percepts; it is 
primarily apprehended when we detect the unitary identity of a percept across 
changing sensations (Hua IV, p. 41). Realität emerges from the primordial 
sphere of experience, but this is not enough to fully characterize it, because 
Realität must also involve intersubjective agreement on its determinations 
(Hua IV, pp. 86-7): Realität is spatiotemporally determined in objective 
(intersubjective) space and objective (intersubjective) time. 
 Although Husserl’s analyses of spatial and temporal constitution are so 
thorough that any resumé runs the risk of being gross and unfair, we need to 
give a cursory account of such constitution in order to proceed to the next 
stage of our argument. For Husserl, both spatial and temporal determinations 
are originally drawn from living relations involving embodied consciousness. 
Spatial determinations are originally drawn from perceptual correlations 
between our own perceiving body and the visual and tactual material 
surroundings: before becoming abstract spatiality available for physical 
specifications, space is primarily experienced as body-related coordinates such 
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as up-down, left-right, before-behind. But when this experiential pattern has to 
gain intersubjective validity, all references to a specific body as a viewpoint 
from which all particular determinations are defined must be neutralized, and 
this leads to objective spatiality, which is propaedeutic to the introduction of 
abstract physical spatiality. As to temporality (to which we will return later), 
its core is represented by an immanent order of succession that can be 
determined only when consciousness “articulates” primal impressions into 
retentions and protentions. This implies that primarily any present is the living 
present relevant to an actually living subject, and that this is the divide that 
determines what is antecedent and what is successive in general. Again, if this 
early notion of temporality has to obtain intersubjective validation, then all 
particular references to actually living subjects and to their primal impressions 
must be suspended; to the extent that such suspension can take place, the 
temporality of consciousness becomes objective temporality as universal order 
of succession, which is preliminary to the constitution of abstract physical 
time. In order for both objective temporality and objective spatiality to become 
abstract physical representations a process of mathematical idealization must 
take place, where ordinal relations of juxtaposition and succession turn into 
numerically quantified relations. 
 This cursory account of the constitution of space and time must suffice 
for an analysis of the notion of event, which is at the core of Davidson’s 
anomalous monism. From a Husserlian perspective, the naturalistic notion of 
event, far from being something simple and original, turns out to be the name 
of a multiply stratified construct, which constitutively refers to different layers 
of experience. Events are not ready-made spatiotemporal particulars available 
to be picked up by physical laws. The first layer of what are to become 
naturalistic events is provided by the manifestation of transcendence by 
perceptual experience; secondarily the perceived spatiotemporal transcendence 
must obtain objectivity through intersubjective recognition; and finally the 
mathematization of spatiality and temporality enables translation of what 
initially are just perceptual objects into anonymous numerically quantifiable 
determinations -- that is, into physical point-instants. From this genetic 
perspective on the constitution of events, we are thus in a position to provide a 
qualified reading of some of the difficulties inherent in the Davidsonian 
account. 
 (1) On the hiatus between the mental and the physical. As we noticed, 
Davidson’s notion of mental events was circumscribed to propositional 
attitudes, and this was motivated by the fact that the argument for anomalous 
monism depends on the rational character of the mental. However, by 
depicting the dimension of the mental in these terms Davidson creates an 
inexplicable gap between the physical and the mental. While prima facie the 
relation between the physical and the mental is described by Davidson with 
reference to perception and action, in the end their interaction is read in the 
terms of abstract event causality. The abstract conceptual platform provided by 
event causality is justified by the extrinsic nature of the connection between 
the mental and the physical, which goes in parallel with the disregard for the 
analysis of experience (perceptual experience, to begin with). The hiatus 
between mental and physical accounts of events tends to split Davidson’s 
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vision into a naturalistic dimension of physical events, where subjectivity as 
such is removed, and an “intersubjectivist” dimension concerning how events 
are described, where no transcendent constraint seems to be imposed on 
(inter)-subjective interpretation. In Husserlian terms, Davidson is not 
questioning the genesis either of physical reality or of intersubjective 
agreement, which are simply assumed without exploring their roots in 
subjective consciousness (with special reference to perceptual constitution). 
By examining how perceptual constitution is articulated into primal 
impressions, retentions and protentions, affections and hylé, transcendence and 
Realität, Husserl shows how the dimensions of the mental and the physical 
gradually branch out of a common origin. 
 (2) On the alleged ontological privilege of physical events. From a 
Husserlian point of view the ontological role played by physical events can be 
denounced as unwarranted. As we saw, Davidson considers physical events at 
two levels, as objects of physical descriptions and as core elements of 
ontology irrespective of any description. Being physical equates with being 
described in a physical vocabulary; however, events in themselves, 
irrespective of description, are understood as spatiotemporal particulars, that 
is, in the last instance, as physical point-instants. The privilege attributed to 
physical events has been variously criticized, but all criticisms are fruitless 
until it is shown why events should not be primarily conceived in physical 
terms. When we analyze events in the terms provided by the 
phenomenological constitution of Realität, we have a model where the original 
dimension of events is represented by an instance of anonymous sensuous 
“givenness” (primal impressions or kin notions), which is no more physical 
than mental, that is, is lacking all determinations that could support mental or 
physical descriptions. This implies also the lack of all spatial and temporal 
determinations. In this framework, physical events have no privilege and there 
is no reason to support the thesis that “all mental events are physical, but not 
all physical events are mental”. This thesis cannot rely on the alleged fact that 
“all events described in mental terms can be described in physical terms, 
whereas not all events described in physical terms could be described in 
mental terms”. Indeed, this is patently false, since we can describe in mental 
terms all events described in physical terms. It would be strange indeed if the 
content of a description (physical ones included), which is a mental event in 
any possible acceptation of the mental, could not be described also in mental 
terms. The only thing that can be granted is that all events (instances of 
anonymous sensuous “givenness”) can receive a physical description as well 
as a mental one. 
 (3) On the alleged ontological privilege of event causality. The most 
important change of perspective that we must note concerns the relationship 
between events and causation. In the Davidsonian account of events it is not 
clear how causal powers could ever be attributed to spatiotemporal particulars. 
We are told that events causally interact regardless of how they are described, 
however events understood as physical point-instants do not seem to leave 
room for “efficaciousness”. In fact, Davidson’s notion of event seems to 
define more an ideal object than an event, and it is awkward to say that a point 
or a collection of points in space and time exercises “causal power” on other 
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points. Since properties are something that must be attributed to events by 
descriptions, we are invited to conceive of causality as a relationship between 
events regardless of their properties, but such event-causality does not account 
well for the efficaciousness of causes. And indeed, Davidson does not focus 
on the efficaciousness of causality, but only on its law-like aspects; this is 
what is implied by the principle of the nomological character of causality. The 
point of being a cause is no longer to “make things happen” but to fit in 
universally quantified statements supporting counterfactuals and leading to 
forecasts. But by interpreting causality in terms of strict physical laws we 
subject the notion of cause to a theoretical metamorphosis, where the aspects 
that fit into laws (positions in time and space) gain the upper hand, while 
efficaciousness (force, power, resistance) appears as secondary or irrelevant. 
As Davidson himself recalls, this is indeed how physics treats causality, which 
is expunged from the formulation of physical laws. In the Husserlian 
framework, on the contrary, events are naturally efficacious since they are 
constitutively affecting. It seems that we have come to a point where causality 
is suspended between an account in terms of laws, which stresses on positions 
in space and time, and an account that focuses on efficaciousness, where 
spatial and temporal determinations are a late result of constitution. At this 
point, our discussion has progressed enough to tackle its main object: we must 
understand how causation is to be properly understood if we want to gain a 
picture where anomalous monism (of a sort) is in place, without running the 
risk of epiphenomenalism, that is, without making out of mental causation an 
enigma or an illusion. 
 
3 Consciousness and causality 
 
 Husserl intensively deals with the relationship between consciousness 
and causality in Ideen II, and it does not seem that his opinions on this 
question significantly change in later works. For Husserl, Realität and 
Kausalität belong together; they are both notions that emerge from the 
constitution of things, which presupposes perceptual activity and the 
constitution of objective (intersubjective) space and time. Real (real) qualities 
are constitutively causal; to know a thing means to have knowledge, consistent 
with experience, about how the thing behaves when it is pushed, pressed, bent, 
heated, etc. (Hua IV, p. 45) 
 Now, we have seen how efficaciousness can be primarily recognized in 
events (as primal impressions, or kin notions), but it is not immediately clear 
how such efficaciousness should be represented in order to become causality 
proper. One thing is the idea of the experience of something transcendent that 
affects me; quite another thing is the idea of a general power to produce 
affections, regardless of the presence of actual consciousness. True enough, 
we can straightforwardly conceive of an event taking place without any 
present consciousness to the extent that we determine such an event in terms 
that make implicit reference to a possible instantiation of consciousness: roses 
are still red when nobody looks at them, because we attribute the properties 
that they would manifest if somebody looked at them. But is there a similar 
straightforward way to make experienced efficaciousness independent of the 
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actual availability of consciousness? And would this objectified 
efficaciousness be equivalent to ordinary causality? In fact, causality is a 
complex notion and we need to disentangle its constitution before trying to see 
if and how causality can be understood as objectified efficaciousness.  
Husserl does not really produce such an analysis, although his general 
vision is rather clear: causality in the sense in which we use the term with 
reference to natural processes is not a concept whose validity can be extended 
without limits to all ontological regions. The causality pertinent to acting 
subjects is not the causality of nature (Hua VI, p. 222), and in this sense it is 
wrong to refer to the workings of the soul (Seele) in terms of causality (Hua 
IV, p. 132) When we have to do with events that appear to exercise their 
efficaciousness on the way we are conscious of things -- for instance when we 
are administered a psychotropic drug -- this kind of “psychophysical 
causality” is not termed causality, but “conditionality” (Konditionalität), and 
the effects that we may experience at the level of perception or judgment are 
not to be understood as effects of causes in the ordinary sense of natural 
causality (Hua IV, p. 64; Hua VI, p. 248). The point is that what happens in 
the sphere of consciousness follows the logic of motivation (Motivation) and 
not of efficient causality, and this implies that all events of which we are 
conscious take place in a framework determined by intentional relations and 
are irreducible to extrinsic causes. Still, it does not seem that Husserl arrives at 
a wholly satisfactory view of the relationship between consciousness and 
motivation on the one hand, and reality and causality on the other. What is 
clear is that motivation and natural causality are two distinct and incompatible 
ways to describe events, much like mental and physical descriptions are in 
Davidson. Where Davidson says that the logic of mental events is such that 
beliefs can be supported or refuted only by further beliefs, Husserl shows that 
all connections between events of which we are conscious are defined by 
intentional relations. In both cases it is nonsensical to interpret the workings of 
the mind (or of consciousness as such) in mere causal terms, and this supports 
the ‘anomalousness’ of the relation between mental and physical descriptions. 
 However, while Davidson in the last instance shows an unjustified 
ontological partiality towards physical events, Husserl’s conceptuality does 
not provide any symmetrical partiality towards “mental events”, which would 
spell absolute idealism. The priority of consciousness is ontological priority 
only in a special sense, because it concerns the determinations of Being, not its 
creation. This implies that motivation, which is the principle that rules over 
conscious relations, does not obliterate the primal efficaciousness that is 
manifested in sensuous transcendence. This leaves open the question of the 
relationship between the sphere of intentional relations (motivations) and 
primal ontological efficaciousness. How is such primal ontological 
efficaciousness to be interpreted, if we have to refrain from equating it either 
with causality or with motivation? In Ideen II Husserl’s last word about this 
question seems to be an argument via negationis: he recalls the naturalistic 
position, according to which mental causality seems to be a fact, but an 
incomprehensible one that is therefore continuously under threat to be 
regarded as mere appearance (bloßen Schein). Then, however, Husserl 
concludes that such an “enigma” (Rätsel) belongs to the essence of causation 
Eliminato: : “Nicht jede gesetzlich geregelte Funktionalität in der 
Sphäre der Tatsachen ist Kausalität.”
Eliminato: incommensurability
Eliminato:  that determines the anomalous character of monism
 19 
as such, and that consequently mental causation is no more an enigma than is 
causation in general (Hua IV, pp. 259-260). It seems thus that from a 
Husserlian perspective we should treat true ontological efficaciousness in 
somewhat agnostic terms. But this answer is at least partly unsatisfactory, 
because Husserl has not shown how ordinary efficient causation is to be 
regarded as an enigma. It is not enough to rely on Hume’s famous criticism; 
one must display the limits of efficient causality through a phenomenological 
account of its constitutive conceptual layers, a task we shall pursue in the 
remaining pages.  
 In order to outline such analysis, let us consider what appear to be the 
essential constituents of our ordinary understanding of causality. Prima facie 
we would list four such constituents: efficient causality is supposed α) to take 
place between well-determined events, β) to propagate in a contiguous way, γ) 
to follow the temporal order according to which antecedents cause successors 
and δ) to be efficacious (to make things happen). We will not argue for the 
exhaustiveness of this articulation, but we believe that it characterizes the 
common notion of causality and will try to provide a genetic analysis of each 
constituent. 
 (α) Well-determined events. Efficient event causality is something that 
is meant to take place between well-determined events: events that are ideally 
circumscribable in space and time cause other ideally circumscribable events. 
Complex “fuzzy” interactions are supposed to be the sum of linear ones 
connecting well-determined events. However, this is neither a priori evident 
nor actually true to experience. Whenever we reflectively dwell on a causal 
process we easily realize (a) that beginning and end of a causal process are 
chosen according to our driving interests and do not mirror the intrinsic course 
of a causal sequence, which appears to be intrinsically endless; (b) that the 
“causal line” that neatly connects two events is always necessarily surrounded 
by “side-effects”, which are unintended or uninteresting implications. The 
reason why these two objective aspects of efficient causality are disregarded is 
not itself something “caused by facts”, but belongs to the sphere of motivation. 
When we conceive of a specific event as a cause, we give a specific privilege 
to it: it becomes the active side in a correlation where in fact nothing is, 
objectively considered, either simply active or passive. The premise for 
something to be active is that it is an irreducible starting point; otherwise it 
would be understood as a passive transmitter of a previous impulse. But 
clearly nothing can be posited as an irreducible origin at the level of efficient 
event causality. As von Wright argued, at the phenomenal level we have at 
most constant successions, but even if we found a perfectly regular string of 
identical events, we would be never entitled to say that the antecedent (A) in 
the regular sequence causes the constantly associated follower (B). This is the 
case because any constant succession of two elements could be alternatively 
explained by an indefinite third causal factor (C) antecedent to both A and B 
and producing them separately (von Wright 1971, pp. 73-4), without them 
directly connecting at all. 
Von Wright rightly concluded that causality is not understandable 
without reference to the notion of action, which names the actual 
efficaciousness of an event on another and not just their constant association. 
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If we really want to “purify” causality from all intentional contributions, we 
should make an effort to conceive of causality as continuous endless and 
directionless efficacy. Causality in itself, whatever it may be, cannot have 
points of origin; causal sequences do not begin, do not end, and do not go in a 
single direction; only if and when events are actively circumscribed by us do 
origins, ends, and directions begin to emerge. When physical experiments are 
performed, we look for specific repeatable connections and are ready to grant 
that not all causally relevant variables are under our control, provided that they 
can be regarded as uninfluential for our concerns. This is of course the only 
sensible procedure from the point of view of our anthropic interests, but we 
should not fall prey to the illusion that we therefore somehow know that 
causality is intrinsically articulated into a finite number of ordered sequences 
of events, which we could in principle, if not in practice, exhaustively list and 
dominate. Such alleged finite list is an ideal product of our efforts to put order 
in the world of experience. 
Indeed, there is no originating event in the first place, not only because 
the sequence of causes has no origin, but because “objectively” events have no 
specifiable boundaries. When we conceive of events as if they were point-
instants, we ideally eliminate the problem of the ontological identity of the real 
event by substituting the procedure of identification for its content: events 
become the coordinates that allow us to identify events. But a point-instant is 
an ideal entity to which no actual causal power can be attributed. On the other 
hand, if we wanted to fill the notion of event with empirical content, we 
should talk of a process unit lacking intrinsic boundaries, because there is no 
intrinsic boundary between what happens and what is caused to happen. Just 
as we cannot objectively delimit the range of causes and effects intersecting in 
an instantiation of causality, so we cannot objectively say where an event is 
exhausted and another one begins. We can and do determine events, but there 
is no such a thing as an intrinsically well-determined event. 
 (β) Contiguity. This leads us to the classical question of the contiguity 
of effects. As we saw, Davidson noticed that the causal powers pertinent to 
agents are described in terms that go beyond strict contiguity, allowing the 
accordion effect. Put in these terms, it seems that strict contiguity in the 
propagation of effects is the objective rule of which effects at a distance are 
the subjective exception. I can be said to break the window by swinging the 
bat and hitting the ball, while the bat is not said to break the window, but to 
produce a sequence of contiguously propagating causes that involve, among 
other things, the breaking of the window. Indeed, from a naturalistic point of 
view there seems to be a strong propensity towards conceiving causal relations 
between events as constitutively contiguous, even when no intermediate links 
between cause and effect are manifest. This is apparent if we think of the 
approach of field physics: for instance, when we describe how an 
electromagnetic field operates, we describe it as if it contiguously affected 
what otherwise would appear as something influenced at a distance. The 
concept of field transforms an apparent effect at a distance into a contiguous 
effect (cf. Bunge 2009, p. 60). 
 However, granted that there may be good reasons for setting physical 
causation in a framework of contiguous interactions, what is the actual role of 
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contiguity in causality? The first thing that we have to observe is that strict 
contiguity ideally involves absolute proximity, but absolute proximity is an 
idealization and does not tolerate any distance. Therefore, if we should be 
faithful to causal propagation by strict contiguity we would be never able to 
conceive of any propagation at all. As in Zeno’s paradoxes, the ideal nature of 
events conceived as ideal point-instants leads to the inconceivability of motion 
(here of propagation). Let us suppose that event A should contiguously cause 
event B; if event A is located in point α, and event B in point β, different from 
α, then the propagation of causality from α to β is propagation at a distance, 
because however close we take α and β, there will be always infinite points 
between them. If there were no points between α and β, they would be the 
same spatiotemporal determination and no propagation would take place. This 
means that, conceptually speaking, causal propagation cannot but involve a 
distance, i.e. a spatial difference, between causing events and caused ones. 
Therefore contiguity is not just extrinsic to the essence of causality, as Mario 
Bunge has shown (Bunge 2009, p. 62), but is even inconsistent with the very 
idea of causal propagation. The claim that causation operates by contiguity 
does not rely on empirical facts, but is an ideal demand iterable on any causal 
link. 
 But if contiguity is a demand that we are prone to impose on causal 
accounts, what is the nature of such a demand? We demand that attention be 
primarily paid to the relatively closer events in each chain of causal 
propagation. But why do we do so? We do so because, when we isolate a 
causal chain, we identify an effect as terminus ad quem of the sequence 
according to our salient interests. Once the end is identified, our interest goes 
to the means that are supposed to lead to that end; therefore, we are concerned 
in principle with all the intermediate steps leading to the interesting end. In 
this framework our focus on contiguity in the propagation of causes 
consistently follows our interest for the “means” leading to the “end”. But 
then we should say, with Davidson, that the styles of causal propagation 
concerning event causality and agent causation are indeed different, but 
against Davidson, that the intentional character of agent causation pertains 
also to event causality. The descriptions of causal propagation in non-
contiguous terms that Davidson admits only for agent causation (accordion 
effect) cannot be bypassed when we deal with event causality. Agency is 
decisively present in our descriptions of efficient event causality; and 
contiguity, far from being an intrinsic feature of causes, is an ideal demand 
imposed on causal accounts in order to investigate causes as possible means to 
ends. The focus of efficient causality on the relatively closer steps is relative 
to the identification of a causal unit with a beginning and an end, which is 
possible only by descriptions in agential terms (as in the accordion effect). 
 (γ) Temporal order. In fact, spatial contiguity in the propagation of 
causes can also be read as a correlate of temporal succession. Since causes 
unfold by following a temporal order where the antecedent immediately 
affects the subsequent, the propagation of effects must follow a spatial order 
where the antecedent contiguously affects the subsequent. But, although we 
may be ready to grant the highest degree of certainty to the order of succession 
that characterizes ordinary efficient causation, we have to realize that such 
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order is no more intrinsic to causation than the pattern of contiguous 
propagation (cf. Bunge 2009, p. 63ff.). 
 Still, we are not just interested in seeing whether temporality and 
causation are intrinsically or extrinsically connected; we want to understand 
what the nature of this connection is. The Husserlian reflection on time and 
consciousness has been highly influential and is rather well-known; 
nevertheless, I think that its implications for the issue of mental causation have 
not yet been fully appreciated. Husserl observes that our ability to conceive of 
the past and the future presupposes an immanent associative dimension which 
produces the very unfolding “strings” of events that we resort to in our 
reflexive apprehension of time. “Retention” is the train of impressions that is 
retained in consciousness whenever we are engaged in intentional acts, and 
this allows us to interpret events as elements in an unfolding pattern. We could 
never hear a piece of music as such if our hearing were tied to the 
instantaneous presence of the sound, but retentions allow us to understand a 
musical note as “coming from the preceding ones”. Retentions are given to 
thematic consciousness only secondarily, by a reflective act, but primarily they 
have a “latent” unthematic nature. This is the case for protentions as well, 
which, however, are given to consciousness in a characteristically different 
way. Protentions are on display when we are surprised by something, even if 
we did not consciously expect anything; in these cases we realize that an 
immediate tacit expectation was latently at work. Strictly speaking, neither are 
retentions properly past nor protentions properly future, since they are the 
experiential premises for the constitution of full-fledged past and future, which 
require the ability to recognize events in an objective (intersubjectively valid) 
order of succession.  
Now, a superficial reading of Husserl’s pages on inner time-
consciousness -- especially when it is limited to the 1905 lectures -- can lead 
to psychologistic interpretations where retention and protention are understood 
as psychological faculties. For example, retention may be interpreted as just 
another name for short-term memory. This approach deprives Husserl’s 
reflection on time of its ontological grip. When Husserl speaks about the 
constitution of temporality, he is not speaking metaphorically, as if the point 
was to make out the “mere consciousness” of temporality, while temporality in 
itself would lie somewhere else, untouched by the fate of consciousness. The 
core of temporality is provided by the order of succession of events, and such 
order is conceivable only insofar as there is a constituting consciousness 
(which is not a physical brain). 
This point can be best understood if we reflect on the nature of our 
representation of the physical. Let us suppose that we assume that there is an 
intrinsic order of succession in nature, which must be merely recorded by 
consciousness but which does not need any consciousness to be in place. Yet, 
is there anything described in terms of pure physical matter that can account 
for the establishment of an order of succession? Let us imagine that a 
meteorite travels in a subjectless universe and hits “over time” various minor 
heavenly bodies; and then let us ask where, at any point, the bygone 
succession of collisions is to be found. An ideal physical description can give 
us at most a finite amount of signs or traces left on the present meteorite by the 
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collisions, with the proviso that they cannot be really interpreted as signs or 
traces. In fact, all we ideally have is a present snapshot of the physical state of 
the meteorite, where nothing intrinsically expresses the fact that some present 
configurations of the meteorite refer to its past collisions. The surface of the 
meteorite would be like an impressed film where all impressions have taken 
place on the same photogram: nothing can tell us what the order of succession 
of the impressions was. Actually, even if we had a footage of the history of 
collisions of the meteorite, in the absence of an instantiation of consciousness 
this would be just another present piece of matter (an exposed photographic 
film), which does not bear the slightest intrinsic reference to any order of 
succession of events. To become indicative of an order of succession the film 
must be read, and this reading cannot be performed by further physical states 
of affairs, but requires consciousness.  
The point is that no present amount of physical matter, whatever its 
configuration, can be conceived as repository of an order of succession: not 
the surface of the meteorite, not a filmed record, and not even a cerebral state. 
Merely present events must become part of a living present in order to become 
signs or traces of something, and in order to become patterns of events ordered 
in a succession. This implies, among other things, that temporality in itself 
requires consciousness, i.e., that there is no temporality in the absence of 
consciousness. The living present retains the just gone events in sight of the 
coming ones, and expects specific events to come in the wake of the retained 
ones. This living process weaves together events as experiences and thus 
constitutes meaningful units unfolding “over time”. 
 However, to understand the ontological implications of this view of 
temporality is far from easy and directly involves the relationship between 
time and causality. Indeed, one could wonder if, by tracing temporality back to 
consciousness, we are not just slipping into absolute idealism. But this is not 
the case, since we are not saying that consciousness creates all events, but only 
that it establishes their order of succession, which must be therefore 
understood as something that does not intrinsically belong to “nature in itself”. 
Still, somebody might object that we have at most shown that consciousness is 
the only “thing” that can discover and properly record successions: 
successions should be taken to exist in themselves in order for consciousness 
to detect them. However, the fact that successions are “discovered” and not 
created does not imply that events intrinsically unfold in objective 
successions. They “unfold” insofar as they take place as phenomena, which 
call upon subjectivity. Actually, in the absence of subjectivity there are no 
proper events, although we have reason to grant that “something exists in 
itself”. No order of spatial coexistence or temporal succession can be granted 
in a subjectless world -- therefore no forms, structures, configurations, units, 
no unitary things and no oriented motions. The claims about “nature in itself” 
that phenomenological experience can justify are just the independent 
subsistence of “something” and the independent occurrence of “changes”. 
 It is undoubtedly hard to conceive such a subjectless universe, since 
everything we can imagine is bound to appear as a structured unit located in 
subject-relative space and time. Still, if we realize that both coexistence and 
succession are relative to a living viewpoint, we can “represent” via negationis 
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a universe where neither coexistences nor successions are recognizable 
options. In the absence of any point of view and of any privileged medium of 
apprehension (e.g., sight), we realize that all possible entities lose their unity 
and their identity; we can assume that the units that we actually identify are 
carved out from an infinite patternless “stuff” according to a point of view and 
a privileged medium of apprehension. All events, all things and all processes 
appear to exist as selections brought to light by consciousness when dealing 
with alterity. But “selection” here must not be understood as if it were the 
circumscription of a particular in a larger picture, because this interpretation 
would imply that our awareness of reality is just quantitatively limited, but that 
it can be exhaustively faithful to nature within those quantitative limits. 
Consciousness “selects” in a radical sense, involving the way in which objects 
and all their attributes are given. 
Should we dare to provide an image of this sense of “selection” by 
consciousness, we would resort to the following (old-fashioned) analogy. As 
the world given to our sight and the world given to our smell give us 
incommensurable attributes resting on the same ontological basis, and as 
neither class of attributes can by itself reveal the existence of the other, 
analogously we should try to conceive of our world as “existing” in the “same 
space and time” simultaneously with an indefinite number of “other worlds” 
that we are not in a position to recognize (and that, therefore, can be only 
improperly called “worlds”). Such worlds could in principle interfere with our 
world, even if no “logic” could be recognized in such possible interferences. 
Thus, for instance, if there were “impulses” transmitted at infinite speed 
(which cannot be excluded either logically or empirically), they could not be 
said to propagate through space and time, and therefore they could never be 
recognized as causal processes, although they could interfere with, or even 
incognito permeate, our world. What we must conclude is that causation as 
efficaciousness (as in the above mentioned “interferences”) and its temporal 
order are totally independent phenomenal dimensions. 
 (δ) Efficaciousness. At this point we should begin to recognize that the 
transcendent (intrinsic) core of causality is represented by efficaciousness 
alone, which is not constitutively tied to any specific way to “transmit” it (cf. 
Cartwright 2004). We are justified in granting that at the core of what we call 
causality there is intrinsic efficaciousness: “things” happen and are made 
happen regardless of consciousness. But when we further assume that 
causality unfolds between well-determined events, by contiguous intermediate 
steps and in a temporal order, we introduce traits that depend on how 
experiences are given to consciousness. This, we insist, does not mean that 
these traits of efficient event causality are somehow “delusional” or 
“fallacious” but defines the appropriate explanatory level at which efficient 
causality can operate: only in a world where subjectivity and agency are 
originally given there is room for ordinarily understood efficient causality. 
 When saying that efficaciousness lies at the core of causality, we must 
be wary to refrain from any naturalistic reading of efficaciousness. For 
instance, we have to reject any attempt to account for efficaciousness in terms 
of physical notions like the conservation laws (Dowe 2000, Salmon 1998). 
Indeed, it must be noticed that we can preserve our understanding of 
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efficaciousness even if we imagine that conservation laws are violated. Even if 
part of the inertial momentum in the notorious clash of Humean billiard balls 
would get inexplicably lost, we would not deny that the first ball has been 
efficacious on the second. Furthermore, we cannot use the empirical 
instantiations of any conservation law to define the nature of efficaciousness, 
since our organization of physical experiments and empirical investigations 
presupposes a preliminary grasp of efficaciousness, which need not refer to 
any physical theory. Thus, even if we believed that conservation laws are the 
correct physical representation of causality, efficaciousness must be 
discussable without reference to it. 
 A genetic constitution of causality, as far as we have reconstructed it, 
shows that efficaciousness is originally experienced as sensuous 
transcendence, primarily at the level of primal impressions. At this level, 
which is the one where we have identified the appropriate room for events as 
anonymous particulars, there is no active-passive divide yet. When percepts 
are constituted, the recognition of a last irreducible dimension of objectual 
efficaciousness consolidates. And when agency and objects are constituted, if 
we try to grasp the originally alien dimension of efficaciousness, we do it by 
articulating experienced reality into events connected by causes, where 
conceiving of a causing event is tantamount to conceiving of an intervening 
agent. This is the level of description where efficient causality proper is in 
place, with its reference to well-determined events that act on other well-
determined events by contiguous stages, where antecedents cause successors. 
Once efficient causation is constituted, we can successfully apply its 
descriptive model to manifold explanations, but the only explanatory act that 
is a priori forbidden is the conceptual reduction of agency and subjectivity to 
efficient causality, because the constitution of efficient causality presupposes 
the efficacy of “agent causation”. Now we are in a position to fully 
understand why, as Husserl put it, “Motivation als eine Art Kausalität ansehen 
[…] ist widersinnig” (Hua VI, p. 480). And it should become equally clear 
why mental events cannot be reduced in any sense to physical events, even if 
we accept a monistic ontological framework. 
 
4 Conclusions on mental causation and anomalous monism 
 
 (1) Monism. Monism is supported by the ubiquity of efficaciousness as 
far as efficaciousness is given to consciousness. No articulation of our world, 
regardless of how abstract or ideal, can be said to exist in a dimension foreign 
to efficaciousness of a kind. This does not mean that we have to make out 
where “thoughts cause things”, because efficaciousness is not causality. The 
point is that nothing that we can think can possibly belong to an altogether 
separate ontological sphere, precisely because we can actually think of it, and 
this is already a mental change which has the power to affect bodily changes 
and to be affected by transcendent events. The ubiquity of efficaciousness is 
warranted by the fact that all phenomena can affect and be affected by all 
other phenomena, since consciousness guarantees the interaction of all 
phenomena. Such interaction has motivational and not causal character: while 
Eliminato: embodiment
Eliminato:  the core of
Eliminato: physical notions.
Formattato: Tipo di carattere: Corsivo
Eliminato: . This means that 
Eliminato: , which are phenomena to the extent that they are given 
to consciousness
Eliminato: . W
 26 
there are connections that we cannot describe in causal terms, all connections 
can be described in motivational terms.  
When Davidson stated that mental events causally interact with 
physical events, only to conclude later that we cannot rationally describe how 
they are causally connected, he was saying in fact that mental and physical 
events are motivationally connected, whereas we do not have enough 
determinations to establish causal connections. Instead of saying that physical 
events (through sensations) cause changes of beliefs, but do not justify them, 
he should have said that physical events as sensations motivate changes of 
beliefs and that when we describe such motivation in causal terms we lose 
those motivational aspects able to justify the change of belief. Similarly, 
instead of saying that beliefs and desires cause actions, even if we do not know 
how, he should have said that actions are motivated by beliefs and desires, and 
that when we want to describe such motivational connection in causal terms 
we lose the “connective tissue” that keeps together mental and physical events.  
To be clear, the ubiquity of efficaciousness that supports monism is not 
the ubiquity of objective efficaciousness: we do not know and cannot know 
whether everything that in some sense exists can act on everything else. What 
we do know is that all instances of efficaciousness given to consciousness are 
motivating, and therefore they are constitutively tied together at the 
motivational level. When we describe such efficaciousness in the terms of 
efficient causality, we try to apply to the motivational presuppositions for the 
subsistence of events (or objects) an explanatory key born to be applied to 
events (or objects). This operation is constitutively misleading, because 
efficient causality is the form that efficaciousness takes when agents articulate 
experienced processes into ends and means. Efficient causality makes sense 
only when a “meaningful orientation” of life is already given. 
 (2) Final and efficient causes. It is a mistake to think of final causes as 
an explanatory alternative to efficient causes, because finality and efficiency 
are complementary, not alternative notions. On the one hand, efficient 
causality cannot be conceived at all without a motivational dimension 
(agency), which posits an interesting beginning of causation and is “stretched 
forth” (protentions, expectations) towards the relevant effects. However, on 
the other hand, we cannot conceive of ends exercising any direct causal power 
from the future. Apart from the logical paradoxes that can be easily produced 
if we assume that the future can causally affect the present (cf. Black 1956), 
the point is that we simply cannot make sense of an end that is causally 
effective without resorting to efficient causality. Yet, efficient causality is not 
conceptually self-sufficient in order to account for ontological efficaciousness. 
Final causes cannot bypass efficient ones because the motivational dimension 
has an unreal (non-actual) status, in the sense that it does not belong to the 
sphere of existing things: we are motivated by latent items, by desired 
situations, by open possibilities (also the “will to survive” is such a 
motivation). In order to see how something is caused in spatiotemporal reality 
we have to anchor causality in a present state of affairs and this excludes the 
motivational sphere as such from being directly a causal power. But such 
anchoring in present states of affairs is required by an essential motivational 
instance: the present is constitutively the dimension where we are active, and 
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precisely where we are active in the wake of the past and in sight of the future. 
From this point of view causal power can be attributed indeed only to what is 
from time to time the present; and such attribution is grounded in the 
motivational dimension. Whenever we try to imagine that past or future have 
autonomous causal power we posit them as present “somewhere” (for 
instance, as produced configurations of matter or traces in the brain). Thus, it 
is pointless to make efforts to imagine how the past as past or the future as 
future could be causally efficacious, because this can be done only at the price 
of denying the non-actual nature of past and future. The efficaciousness of the 
non-actual dimensions of past and future is not the efficaciousness of causes, 
but is  attested by the fact that consciousness posits the privilege of actuality 
for efficient causality. 
 The notion of final cause is a spurious one and must not be used to 
argue for the efficaciousness of the motivational sphere. The motivational 
sphere is to be regarded as efficacious a fortiori insofar as ordinary causality 
(with particular reference to temporal order) is considered to be real. The price 
to pay for asserting the epiphenomenalism of consciousness would be to 
reduce spatial locations, temporal dimensions, and circumscribable events to 
illusions; and this would dissolve efficient causality itself. 
 Objectivism dogmatically assumes the opposition between the 
epistemic and ontological dimensions as a severance between what is given to 
the subject and what intrinsically exists. From a phenomenological perspective 
this opposition is not an assumption, but the outcome of an analysis of 
experience, and its scope is strictly circumscribed. Efficaciousness, but not 
full-fledged causality can be attributed to a subjectless ontology. Causality is 
an essential part of our view of reality, and if we want to preserve it we have 
to preserve phenomena (temporal succession, to begin with), which is possible 
only if we grant efficaciousness to consciousness. Motivation cannot be found 
anywhere in nature because it is at work everywhere, but it is not at work as an 
instance of efficient causation, is no circumscribed spatiotemporal unit. 
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as “mental causation”, but the 
efficaciousness of the motivational sphere is at least as indubitable as the 
reality of event causation. 
 (3) Laws and anomalism. If monism is supported by the ubiquity of 
efficaciousness, the anomalous nature of this monism can be derived from the 
fact that laws of nature and efficaciousness do not belong to the same 
phenomenal sphere. The traits of causality that allow us to construct physical 
laws endowed with predictive powers (α, β, γ) are not the same traits that 
make us say that there is a transcendent dimension of events, or, that there are 
events regardless of how they are described (δ).  
As we saw, Davidson argues that mental events and physical events 
cannot be equally described by strict laws because our interests are differently 
laid: holistic and normative traits would be our concern in the mental sphere, 
while the closure of the physical realm would be our concern with regard to 
physical events. However, Davidson invites us to conceive of the mental and 
the physical as two spheres lying side by side at the same level. Then, since 
the sphere of the mental is conceived in the form of events, we are called to 
wonder how such a peculiar sort of events could interact with physical events, 
Eliminato:  straightforwardly
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and this readily paves the road to epiphenomenalism. But phenomenologically 
we should keep neatly separate two conceptual couples, which operate on 
different planes. One thing is the opposition of the mental and the physical at 
the level of events (in the third person), quite another is the opposition 
between constituting consciousness and transcendence (in the first person). 
Efficaciousness is originally experienced at the level of primal impressions, 
when hylé gets constituted and transcendent traits emerge. Efficaciousness is 
therefore a feature of causality which is co-original with consciousness and 
subsists regardless of the determination of events.  
While efficaciousness is not constituted by consciousness, events as 
spatiotemporal determinations are constituted: α, β and γ depend on 
consciousness and on the motivational sphere. But such spatiotemporal 
determinations are also precisely those features of ordinary efficient causality 
which, once quantified, enter into physical laws. This means that physical laws 
are never in a position to capture consciousness and motivation. However, this 
does not say anything yet about the relationship between physical laws and 
mental events, especially because the very status of mental events as objective 
states of affairs is ambiguous. 
 “Mental” cannot be just synonym of “pertinent to consciousness”, 
because otherwise all events, also physical ones, should count as mental, since 
they are all constitutively pertinent to consciousness (in the first person). By 
mental events we might mean psychological phenomena, which are given only 
in the third person, when we identify manifestations of subjectivity in others. 
Here, it is possible either to focus (1) on the manifestations of subjectivity, 
stressing on the unity of consciousness as far as we recognize it in others’ 
bodily expressions, or (2) on the manifestations of subjectivity, focusing on 
specific bodily functions, connected with consciousness, but investigable in 
isolation (cerebral, neurophysiological and cognitive functions). Mental events 
are anomalous only in the first acceptation, which emphasizes the mental 
character of mental events, but not in the second, which emphasizes the event-
like character of mental events. The impossibility of subsuming mental events 
under strict laws depends on the fact that we treat “mental events” as 
manifestations of a unitary subjectivity, i.e. of an embodied instantiation of 
consciousness. From this perspective mental events can be regarded as 
“anomalous” insofar as consciousness is anomalous, and consciousness is 
anomalous because it is the presupposition of any law.  
To the extent that mental events are expressions of unitary subjectivity, 
the normative and holistic characters that Davidson mentions are pertinent. 
But in this sense the objective spatiotemporal determinations of mental events 
are completely irrelevant to their nature, in the same sense in which the fact 
that they are constituted by consciousness is irrelevant to the nature of 
physical events and physical laws. Essential to “mental events” is their nature 
as expressions of subjectivity and they are to be explained with reference to 
the closed system of motivations, as much as physical events demand to be 
explained with reference to the closed system of physical nature. The 
Davidsonian asymmetry between mental and physical events is therefore 
unsubstantiated. 
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  Davidson’s propensity to regard mental events as a subset of physical 
events is not accidental, however, but is due to the original sin of assuming an 
ontology of spatiotemporal events. Consciousness does not primarily appear 
among events and we learn to recognize consciousness in alter egos (as mental 
events proper) only secondarily, after being able to recognize spatiotemporal 
events (objects) as such. In other words, the “mental” is not primarily a matter 
of events and assuming the privilege of an ontology of spatiotemporal events 
(naturalism) necessarily subordinates the “mental”. As soon as the mental is 
treated as an aspect of events, motivation is subordinated to efficient causality, 
and efficient causality is interpreted as naturally conducive to laws. When 
physics expunges causal accounts from strict laws, this operation, in 
phenomenological terms, is tantamount to preserving the constituted 
dimensions of efficient causality (α, β and γ) and dismissing the original 
dimension of efficaciousness (δ). But, as soon as the mental becomes an 
attribute of events, consciousness and motivation become phenomenal residua, 
unresolved appearances, in the last instance and regardless of any will to the 
contrary, epiphenomena. 
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